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Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute 
there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and 
when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 
(Santayana, 1905/1998:82) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In my previous editorial, as well as reflecting on the collection of papers in the issue, I 
provided a brief overview of the range of methods that are available to us as scholars of 
management history, and attempted to demonstrate the range of perspectives and styles that 
can be, and are being, brought to the various subjects of study here in JMH.  I’d like to 
continue in this themed vein and, in this issue of JMH, I explore other aspects of scholarship, 
using Boyer’s (1990) model of scholarship as a touchstone.  But first, some observations on 
the current collection of papers. 
 
As part of a continuing study of the parallels between military/grand strategy formulation and 
the similar activity in business (cf Grattan, 20005, 2004a, 2004b), the first paper in this issue 
of the Journal of Management History (Grattan, 2006) reviews the eleven lessons propounded 
by Robert McNamara in the film “The Fog of War” and considers them in the context of 
theories of strategic management.   The film is taken as a case study and the evidence is 
considered against the background of Mr McNamara’s career and contemporary events, 
triangulated wherever possible by additional accounts so that bias is avoided as much as 
possible.  Grattan (2006) finds that, despite a life-long rational, empirical approach, 
McNamara has discovered that there are limits to these methods, while there are also values, 
morals and ethics to consider.  In turn, business strategists should acknowledge the limits of 
rationality and the importance of intangible factors, especially those involving the vagaries of 
human nature. 
 
In the next paper, Yoo, Lemak and Choi (2006) consider strategy implementation.  Their 
work reflects a key theme of JMH- the extent to which the past informs the present and the 
future – by way of an examination of how Fayol’s principles of management can be utilised to 
effectively implement Porter’s cost leadership and differentiation strategies.  In doing so, Yoo 
and his colleagues once again remind us that earlier writers like Fayol (and perhaps now even 
Porter?) are not merely of “historical” interest, but continue to offer valuable insights to 
contemporary managers. 
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That is not to say that we should not be on the lookout for ways to further develop and 
improve those insights to match other developments in the marketplace.  This has been the 
work of Lagrosen and Svensson (2006) in the presentation of their framework of marketing 
schools.  Noting that recent developments in marketing, such as services marketing, industrial 
marketing and relationship marketing, do not fit earlier frameworks of marketing schools, 
their updated framework seeks to incorporate these developments.  One of their concerns is to 
“assist practitioners to understand the current status of marketing by connecting to the past, 
and the future by revealing unexplored areas of the marketing discipline”. 
 
Readers may re-call last year’s paper by Kidd and Low (2005), who found that, from pre-
medieval to post-modern times, logistics routes and their modalities have not changed much.  
In the same way, Low (2006) has examined management and economic practices in the 
building processes of ancient China as presented in the Yingzao Fashi (or “Treatise on 
Architectural Methods”), which explains the official systems instituted for public projects; the 
management of labour, design and planning of construction works; quantity surveying 
practices; the use, control and recycling of building materials; and inspection of building 
elements. The results of his examination suggest that lessons in the principles of construction 
project management in ancient China bear many similarities with modern-day project 
management. 
 
Another paper on management in China, albeit in regard to management knowledge of more 
recent vintage (Morgan, 2006), shows that Chinese entrepreneurs and managers were exposed 
to modern management ideas from the early 20th century.  Utilising a variety of Chinese 
journal articles, archive materials and books from the period, Morgan’s (2006) paper shows us 
that Chinese industrialists, officials and academics were attracted to Taylor’s ideas of 
scientific management during the 1920s and 1930s.  Far from being a new phenomenon, the 
transfer to China of management ideas has been (at least) a century-long process of transfer 
and adaptation of western management theory and practice.  
 
This apparent “confusion” as to the spread of Taylor’s influence might be due to the disparate 
portrayals of his ideas across different textbooks (Payne, Youngcourt, and Watrous, 2006).  
Payne and her colleagues (2006) examined 93 books used as textbooks in a variety of 
management and psychology programs to see the extent to which they presented a similar or 
dissimilar picture of Taylor and his works.  They established, inter alia, that the majority of 
information contained therein was reasonably accurate.  On the other hand, insofar as the 
space devoted to Taylor varied between 20 and 2150 words, one could gain a very different 
impression of the significance of the man and his ideas, according to the textbook chosen.  
They conclude with a call to the textbooks’ authors and publishers, as well as those 
responsible for their incorporation in management curricula, to remember the importance of 
providing students a comprehensive, accurate representation of the material they cover.  
 
This now brings me to my observations about the scholarship of representation and Boyer’s 
(1990) model, which goes beyond the traditional focus on research to give equal weight to 
other important aspects of academic work, viz: 
 
Surely, scholarship means engaging in original research. But the work of the scholar also 
means stepping back from one's investigation, looking for connections, building bridges 
between theory and practice, and communicating one's knowledge effectively to students. 
Specifically, we conclude that the work of the professoriate might be thought of as having 
four separate, yet overlapping, functions. These are: the scholarship of discovery; the 
scholarship of integration; the scholarship of application; and the scholarship of teaching 
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(Boyer, 1990:16) 
Boyer describes traditional research – the pursuit and discovery of new knowledge for its own 
sake – as the scholarship of discovery.  This kind of scholarship not only contributes to the 
stock of human knowledge but also to the intellectual climate of the university.  The 
scholarship of integration makes connections and draws insights from discrete facts and 
findings.  As Boyer (1990:19) says, "what we mean is serious, disciplined work that seeks to 
interpret, draw together, and bring new insight to bear on original research.   The scholarship 
of application, the service role of the academic, is concerned with questions such as "How can 
knowledge be responsibly applied to consequential problems? How can it be helpful to 
individuals as well as institutions?...Can social problems themselves define an agenda for 
scholarly investigation?" (Boyer, 1990: 21).  Here the academic relates acquired knowledge 
in one's own field of expertise to the larger community.  Boyer’s (1990) fourth form of 
scholarship is that of teaching, what we might call the scholarship of representation.  At its 
best, teaching is not only the transmission of knowledge, but the transformation and extension 
of knowledge through study and debate.  
The scholarship of discovery and integration is, of course, the “bread and butter” of traditional 
academia, while the scholarship of application is the sine qua non of JMH as regards the 
implications we draw from our traditional scholarship in management history to apply to 
current management issues.  Satisfied that our conceptions of the past are developed in ways 
that, as far as possible, make them useful in creating our future, we then need to represent 
those conceptions in a meaningful way to those who wish to learn the lessons – we complete 
the cycle of scholarship in management history through our efforts to transmit and transform 
that which we have discovered, integrated and identified as relevant.  Following is an example 
of my approach to “closing the loop” in the classroom. 
 
In issue 12(1) of JMH, I commented on the excellent analysis by Michele and Paul Govekar 
(2006) concerning the Triangle (1911) and Hamlet (1991) fires, identified as the worst and 
second-worst industrial accidents in the United States.  I drew parallels with the Challenger 
and Columbia space shuttle disasters, suggesting that the Govekars’ (2006) findings were not 
dissimilar to the findings of both space shuttle disaster investigations – a failure of regulation 
and regulatory effort were found to be significant contributors to the fires and their 
consequences, while the culture of NASA and its safety regimes were implicated in both sets 
of findings in relation to the space shuttle “accidents” (cf , Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986; Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003). I 
concluded my comments on their paper by expressing the hope that those who need to learn 
the lessons of Triangle and Hamlet identified by Govekar and Govekar (2006) are as 
responsive as NASA has been more recently in relation to the difficulties experienced by 
space shuttle Discovery in July/August 2005 (cf NASA, 2005) and again in June/July 2006 (cf 
NASA, 2006). 
I have more than a passing interest in the circumstances surrounding the Challenger and 
Columbia disasters because, for more than a decade now, I have been using the Challenger 
disaster as a case to demonstrate the importance of taking a multi-perspective approach to 
understanding organisations and the behaviour that occurs in them.  I have used the three 
editions of Bolman and Deal’s (1993/1997/2003) Reframing Organizations as an accessible 
introduction to this multi-perspective approach, considering the structural, human resource, 
political and cultural influences on behaviour in organisations. One of the case studies used by 
Bolman and Deal to highlight the importance of an appreciation of organisational politics is 
that of the disintegration of the space shuttle Challenger seventy-three seconds after launch on 
28 January 1986.  As Bolman and Deal (2003:185) observe, “Challenger was an 
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extraordinary tragedy, but it illustrates political dynamics that are normal and universal in 
organizational life”. 
 
In teaching this case, I take a broader approach than Bolman and Deal’s focus on the politics 
of the decision to launch the Challenger shuttle, identifying the structural, human resource 
and cultural issues that also contributed to the decision.  For example, charged with 
investigating the Challenger disaster, The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident (1986:102) concluded that “a well structured and managed system 
emphasising safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the Solid Rocket Booster joint 
seal. Had these matters been clearly stated and emphasised in the flight readiness process … it 
seems likely that the launch of 51-L might not have occurred when it did”.  This summary 
statement highlights the systemic and cultural issues that formed the context of the decision-
making process. 
 
Even in my first efforts at encouraging students to consider the lessons of this case in the mid-
1990s, I was confronted by students who made comments to the effect that “This was nearly 
10 years ago – we’ve learned a lot and a lot has changed since then”.  I persisted on the basis 
that if that was the approach that we took to anything that was “old”, then apparently we 
would have nothing to learn from Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Sun Zi and the other “ancients”.  
After the exposition of the learning points, the students generally conceded that it was like a 
lot of the case studies they examined – “old”, but probably had something to say.  At the same 
time, the further the timeline extended, the more the students became resistant to this “old” 
case. 
In any event, NASA (1987) had responded to the report of the Presidential Commission with 
its own report on the implementation of the series of recommendations made by the 
Presidential Commission, some 12 months later.  Among the initiatives was the establishment 
of a Space Flight Safety Panel, chaired by astronaut Bryan O'Connor, with a charter to 
promote flight safety for all NASA space flight programs involving flight crews, including 
Space Shuttle and Space Station.  NASA also established an Office of Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance, reporting to the NASA Administrator, with responsibility for related 
functions in all NASA activities and programs. 
Notwithstanding the apparent efforts of NASA, seventeen years later, on 1 February 2003, the 
space shuttle Columbia and its crew were lost during re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, 
sixteen minutes before landing.  The Columbia Accident Investigation Board inquiry heard 
extensive testimony suggested that little had been learned from the lessons of two decades 
earlier (cf Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003), and a series of headlines in the 
New York Times over the following months were eerily familiar: 
 
Engineer Warned of Dire Effects of Liftoff Damage, February 13, 2003 
NASA Is Held Down by Its Own Bureaucracy, February 18, 2003 
NASA Pressed on When Officials Learned of E-Mail About Shuttle February 28, 2003 
Shuttle Myopia, March 4, 2003 
Supervisor at Shuttle Plant Cites Pressure Over Repairs, March 4, 2003 
NASA's Work With Contractors a Focus of Columbia Investigation, March 6, 2003 
NASA E-Mail Writer Says He Was Hypothesizing, March 11, 2003 
Shuttle Team Sought Satellite Assessment of Liftoff Damage March 13, 2003 
NASA Was Asked to 'Beg' For Help on Shuttle Photos, March 14, 2003 
Foam Risk Was Studied Before Fatal Flight, March 22, 2003 
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Panel Examines Whether NASA Was Out of Touch With Safety Problems, March 26, 2003 
Space Agency Culture Comes Under Scrutiny, March 29, 2003 
Senior Engineer Faulted NASA for Not Seeking Satellite Help, April 1, 2003 
Inadequacy of Tests on Shuttle Hinders Part of Inquiry, April 9, 2003 
 
These headlines are included in the teaching materials that now accompany the Challenger 
case that I present to students, as part of the “closing of the loop”.  Just as Govekar and 
Govekar (2006) strove to draw out the parallels between the Triangle and Hamlet fires, so 
there is, sadly, a basis for drawing similar comparisons between the circumstances 
surrounding Challenger and Columbia.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
One can only wonder if the people at NASA would have been like my students in the 
seventeen years between Challenger and Columbia – “we’ve learned a lot and a lot has 
changed since then”?  I suspect not.  Rather, I would like to think that the people at NASA 
continued to try and draw the lessons from the initial disaster.  That being the case, and given 
the subsequent events, it highlights the difficulty of even those close to the events in 
appreciating the lessons and then translating those lessons into changed behaviours. The 
recent responses by NASA to the difficulties experienced with the Discovery shuttle suggest a 
greater appreciation of lessons learned.  It is to be hoped that those students much further 
removed from these events also benefit from the scholarly efforts at discovery, integration, 
application, and transmission/transformation. 
 
AFTERWORD 
 
With this issue, we complete the first year of publication of the Journal of Management 
History as a once more independent journal.  Accordingly, I want to take this opportunity to 
thank all those responsible for contributing to the revitalisation of JMH – all the authors and 
reviewers who have taken up the challenge to demonstrate through their respective labours 
that the scholarship of management history continues to be a worthy endeavour.  The Editorial 
Advisory Board has been a source of great support and inspiration, as has JMH’s excellent 
Managing Editor, Anna Torrance.  Together, we have made progress in true Santayana style – 
through retentiveness; through our remembering of the past and in identifying the lessons for 
us, now and in the future.  Thank you, one and all. 
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